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BAIL OR JAIL: WORTH OF MAN V. UNITY OF SOCIETIES

Adv. Dr. K. P. Kylasanatha Pillay
Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India
Mentor, CG3

In Criminal Cases the State as the guardian of the society bridles the citizen's liberty when the latter is accused of an offence punishable under law.

THE CONSTITUTION: A REPOSITORY OF INVIOLABLE VALUES OF EQUALITY AND DIGNITY – A MESSAGE FROM THE SUPREME COURT

Adv. Parvathy V

Research Assistant

High Court of Kerala

INTRODUCTION “‘The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail – its roof may shake – the wind may blow through it – the storm may enter – the rain may enter – but the King of England cannot enter – all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.’ So be it – unless he has justification by law.” The aforesaid words of William Pitt’s, quoted by Lord Denning , has put into light by the Hon’ble Apex Court in ‘IN RE: DIRECTIONS IN THE MATTER OF DEMOLITION OF STRUCTURES’, by addressing the delicate balance between state authority and individual rights, the Court has highlighted the vital importance of safeguarding the dignity and rights of citizens, particularly the most vulnerable, in the face of arbitrary state actions. The opinion of the court authored by Hon’ble Mr. Justice BR Gavai in association with Hon’ble Mr. Justice KV Viswanathan is an explosive expression of the constitutional fundamentals of equality dignity and humanness. The Hon’ble Apex Court being the guardian and custodian of the citizens, protecting individuals from arbitrary state actions has become especially relevant in the context of demolitions carried out by state authorities, where vulnerable communities often find themselves at the mercy of unchecked executive power. The recent “Bulldozer Judgment” by the Supreme Court brings this issue to the forefront, reinforcing the need for procedural safeguards and ensuring that state actions do not trample on individual rights, particularly the right to shelter. This judgment serves as a crucial reminder of the importance of upholding constitutional values , particularly in cases where executive actions risk undermining the dignity and basic rights of citizens. In this judgment, the Court reaffirms the important role of the judiciary in safeguarding justice, ensuring that even the most marginalized individuals are protected from arbitrary state measures, and that the balance between individual rights and state interests is carefully maintained. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A batch of Writ Petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeks to raise the grievance on behalf of various citizens whose residential and commercial properties have been demolished by the state machinery, without following the due process of law, on the grounds of them being involved as accused in criminal offences. LEGAL ISSUE INVOLVED Whether the properties of the persons, who are accused of committing certain crimes or for that matter even convicted for commission of criminal offences, can be demolished without following the due process of law or not? THE COURT’S DECISION Justice Gavai's judgment is firmly rooted in constitutional principles, particularly the rights to life and shelter under Articles 19 and 21. The Court identified the demolitions as a breach of the right to shelter, observing that actions targeting accused persons without adherence to due process violate the doctrine of equality. By relying on precedents such as Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain and NHRC v. State of Arunachal Pradesh , the Court reaffirmed that the rule of law acts as a check on the arbitrary use of state power. The Court's analysis extended to the principles of natural justice, emphasizing that the executive must adhere to procedural safeguards even in cases involving illegal constructions. Justice Gavai raised a pertinent rhetorical question: “Can it be said that a person who is only accused of committing some crime or even convicted can be inflicted the punishment of demolition…?” The answer, as he declared, is an emphatic no, reflecting a categorical rejection of executive overreach. Rule of Law and Separation of Powers The Court emphasized that bulldozer demolitions amounted to the executive assuming an adjudicatory role, a clear violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Justice Gavai referred to the public trust doctrine, asserting that state officials must act in good faith to serve the public purpose rather than engage in punitive actions disguised as municipal law enforcement. Critique of Executive Overreach and Violation of Separation of Powers Central to the judgment is the Court's reiteration of the principle of separation of powers, emphasizing that the judiciary and the executive operate within distinct domains. The executive’s actions in demolishing properties of accused individuals without trial were deemed an encroachment on judicial functions. This conflation of roles, wherein the executive acts as both adjudicator and enforcer of punishment, was found to contravene constitutional norms. The judgment reaffirmed that adjudicatory functions, particularly the determination of guilt and imposition of penalties, are exclusively within the judiciary’s purview. By circumventing this principle, the executive not only subverts the rule of law but also undermines public trust in the justice system. Rights of the Accused and Institutional Accountability The Court meticulously examined the rights guaranteed to accused individuals under the Constitution, emphasizing the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. It held that punitive measures against accused persons, such as the demolition of property, without legal adjudication, are an affront to their dignity and contravene the right to a fair trial. Furthermore, the judgment underscores that even convicts, let alone accused individuals, cannot be subjected to inhumane or cruel treatment. Institutional accountability was highlighted as an essential corollary to these rights, with the Court emphasizing the need for state authorities to adhere strictly to procedural and legal norms. Any deviation resulting in harm to the accused necessitates accountability mechanisms to address such violations. Procedural Safeguards and Due Process To institutionalize protections against arbitrary demolitions, the Court framed detailed guidelines rooted in principles of due process. These include mandatory notices, opportunities for personal hearings, and the exploration of less extreme alternatives such as compounding or partial demolition. The incorporation of technology, such as designated digital portals for transparency and videographic documentation of demolitions, reflects a progressive approach to ensuring procedural fairness. Collective Punishment and Proportionality A striking aspect of the judgment is its acknowledgment of the collective punishment inflicted by bulldozer demolitions. The Court recognized that such actions disproportionately affect innocent family members and third parties unconnected to the alleged crime. Justice Gavai’s assertion that “a house embodies the collective hopes of family or individuals for stability, security, and a future” is a powerful reminder of the human impact of arbitrary state actions. Moreover, the Court underscored the principle of proportionality, noting that demolition is an extreme and disproportionate measure even in cases of illegal constructions. Justice Gavai delineated alternative legal remedies, such as compounding and partial demolition, stressing that full demolition should only be a last resort. Directions laid down by the Court Exercising its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court issued comprehensive guidelines to regulate demolitions. These include mandatory written notices, clear timelines, opportunities for personal hearings, and a requirement for detailed reasoning in demolition orders. The creation of a digital portal for transparency and accountability is a notable innovation, ensuring that procedural lapses can be documented and addressed.By declaring that violations of the guidelines would amount to contempt of court and imposing personal liability on errant officials, the Court sent a strong message against executive impunity. The decision also recognized the importance of restitution, mandating that public officials bear personal costs for unauthorized demolitions. However, the Court clarified that that these directions will not be applicable if there is any unauthorised structure in any public place such as road, street, footpath, abutting railway lines or any river body or water body and also in cases where there is an order passed by a Court of law. The important guidelines issued by the Apex Court are as follows; 1.A written notice will be served to the owner-occupier of the house prior to the demolition through a registered post.The notice will be served either fifteen days prior to the demolition, or according to the time given by the municipal law, whichever comes later. The time period will start from the date of receipt of the notice by the owner-occupier. 2.The notice would be attached visibly on the outer portion of the building or structure which is to be demolished. 3.The notice should contain -;(a) nature of the unauthorised construction, (b) the grounds, and specific violations for which demolition is being ordered (c) a list of the documents that have to given alongside the reply, (d) date on which personal hearing is fixed (e) before which designated authority hearing will take place. 4.The collectors office and the district magistrate should be emailed the information right after a notice is served. This will ensure that no ‘back-dating’ of notices takes place. The office of the collector and district magistrate should produce an auto-generated reply stating that they had received the information. 5.The collector or district magistrate should designate a local officer who will be provided an email handle. All municipal and local authorities handling building regulations and demolitions must be informed of this designation within a month of this order. 6.Every municipal local authority has to establish a digital portal which would host details about service, posting of notice, reply, show-cause notice, and the order passed. This portal has to be put up within three months from date of order. 7.The designated authority will give a personal hearing to the owner-occupier. After the hearing, a final order will be passed, which must contain the contentions raised in the notice and the authority’s reasoned conclusions on them. It will also state whether compounding or partial demolition of the property was an option, and what reasons led them to conclude that the “extreme step of demolition, the only option available.” 8.The final order of the designated authority can be scrutinised by appellate authority. Significantly, no demolition can take place for fifteen days starting from the date of the final order (which will be displayed on the digital portal). 9.The owner-occupier will be given the chance to remove or demolish the illegal property by themselves within a period of 15 days after receiving the notice. The demolition will be allowed after 15 days if the owner has not removed the property by himself, and compounding or partial demolition is not possible. 10.Even then, before the demolition, a detailed inspection report has to be prepared by the concerned authority, and signed by two witnesses. 11.The demolition will be videographed and a report shall be prepared by the concerned authority. It should contain the list of police and civil personnel who participated in the demolition. The report would be forwarded to the Municipal Commissioner by email and then uploaded on the digital portal. The video recording will be preserved. CONCLUSION In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s judgment in the “Bulldozer Judgment” represents a crucial step in reaffirming the core values of our Constitution as well as , highlights the fact that the fundamental principles that even when the state seeks to enforce the law, it must do so within the boundaries of fairness, proportionality, and respect for human dignity. The Court's clear position against the arbitrary use of demolitions as a form of punishment, especially when targeting vulnerable communities, sends a strong message about the importance of judicial oversight in safeguarding the rights of the marginalized. While the judgment sets important procedural guidelines for demolitions, ensuring that state actions should be more transparent and accountable, it also leaves room for continued growth in our legal understanding. The Court’s ruling highlights the delicate balance between state interests and individual freedoms, and the ongoing need for vigilant judicial scrutiny to prevent executive overreach. Its impact will ultimately depend on how these principles are enforced in practice, and how they extend to those most in need of protection for those living on public land. At its heart, this judgment reaffirms the idea that the Constitution is not a static document, but a living one that evolves with our society, protecting the dignity and rights of every individual. As we move forward, this decision provides hope that our legal system can continue to serve as a bulwark against injustice, ensuring that the rule of law, not the whims of the powerful, prevails. After reading the Judgment, one feels that the top court is becoming even taller than any other institution under the Constitution of India. Edited by CG3 Desk

LIFE IS MORE VALUABLE THAN CASH: IT IS GOLDEN SAYS SUPREME COURT

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Sachin P K,Advocate
High Court of Kerala

In S. RAJASEEKARAN v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [Decision dated 08-01 2025] The court held that the golden hour of an accident victim is very precious and it should be replenished with emergency medical aid without waiting for the procedure of law or the flow of cash.

DISSENTING JUDGMENTS; THE HIDDEN CATALYST FOR LEGAL RESEARCH

Parvathy V., Advocate

High Court of Kerala

INTRODUCTION Legal research stands as the bedrock of judicial systems across the world. The arena of legal research is not confined to a mere recitation of statutory provisions or established case law; it is an ongoing process of critical engagement that involves the analysis, comparison, and synthesis of diverse legal opinions to uncover new insights and pathways for resolving contemporary issues. Only then the true meaning of research as encapsulated in the concept ’re-search,’ can be made true.

JUDICIALISING A CITIZENSHIP CONUNDRUM

Ananthu R. S.,Advocate
High Court of Kerala

INTRODUCTION The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India has given quietus to controversies surrounding Sec.6A of Citizenship Act 1955 in through the Constitution Bench Judgment in RE: SECTION 6A OF THE CITIZENSHIP ACT 1955. Following is a analysis of the implications Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, grants citizenship to a specific category of migrants from Bangladesh to Assam. Section 6A is a special provision inserted into the 1955 Act in furtherance of a Memorandum of Settlement called the “Assam Accord” signed on August 15, 1985, by the then Rajiv Gandhi government with the representatives of the Assam Movement. In the case of Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha v. Union of India[1], a two-Judge Bench referred the matter concerning the constitutional validity of Section 6A to a Constitution Bench. The petitioners have challenged the constitutional validity of Section 6A, asserting that it contravenes Articles 6, 7, 14, 29, and 355 of the Constitution. FACTS OF THE CASE In 1985, the Citizenship (Amendment) Act 1985 was enacted to include Section 6A to the Citizenship Act of 1955. The provision grants citizenship to persons of Indian origin who migrated to Assam from Bangladesh. The provision classifies the class of migrants into two categories based on when they entered Assam: those who entered Assam before 1 January 1966 and those who came to Assam after 1 January 1966 but before 25 March 1971. Section 6A (2) provides that a person would be deemed to be a citizen of India as on 1 January 1966 if the following conditions are fulfilled: a. The person must be of Indian origin. A person is deemed to be of Indian origin if they or either of their parents or their grandparents were born in undivided India b. The person should have come to Assam from a ‘specified territory’ before 1 January 1966. ‘Specified territory’ is defined as territories included in Bangladesh immediately before the commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act 1985. All those persons who were included in the Electoral roll used for the purpose of the General Election to the House of People in 1967 must be considered; and c. The person should have been an ordinary resident in Assam since the date of entry into Assam. Section 6A (3) states that a person must register to secure citizenship in accordance with the rules made by the Central Government under Section 18 if the following conditions are fulfilled: a. The person must be of Indian origin; b. The person must have entered Assam on or after 1 January 1966 but before 25 March 1971 from the specified territory, that is, Bangladesh; c. The person must have been ordinarily resident in Assam since the date of entry into Assam; and d. The person must be detected as a foreigner in accordance with the provisions of the Foreigners Act 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order 1964. The Explanation to Section 6A (3) stipulates that the opinion of the Tribunal constituted under the Foreigners Tribunals Order declaring a person to be a Foreigner is deemed as sufficient proof for requirement (d). Whether the person satisfies the other requirements must be decided on the basis of the opinion of the Tribunal, if there is a finding in the opinion with respect to that requirement. If the opinion does not have a finding with respect to the other requirement(s), the registering authority must refer the questions to the Tribunal. Section 6A (4) states that if the person who has registered under sub-Section (3) is included in the electoral roll for any assembly or parliamentary constituency, their name must be deleted from the roll for a period of ten years from the date of detection as a foreigner. However, a person who has been registered will have the same rights and obligations as a citizen of India except having their name included in the electoral roll for ten years. They will also have the right to obtain passport under the Passport Act 1967. Upon the completion of ten years from the date of detection as a foreigner, a person who has registered would deem to be a citizen of India. The petitioners-initiated proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution, inter alia, for challenging the constitutional validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act. By an order dated 17 December 2014, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India referred the case to a Constitution Bench citing multiple issues. On 17th October 2024, the Constitution Bench upheld the constitutionality of section 6A of the Citizenship Act in a majority judgment of 4:1ratio. ISSUES Whether Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955 constitutionally valid? Critical and Legal Analysis Legislative Competence of Parliament to Enact 6A Petitioner contends that (a) the legislative domain concerning the grant of citizenship to migrants from Bangladesh to India is already governed by Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution; and (b) any modification of the cut-off date specified in Articles 6 and 7 for such migrants requires a constitutional amendment, not a parliamentary legislation. To counter this, respondents contend that, the amendment is permissible in view of Article 11. But the Supreme Court held that Parliament has the power to enact laws on citizenship. This power is provided by Entry 17 of List 1 of the Seventh Schedule, which reads “Citizenship, naturalisation and aliens”. Further, the present situation is also covered by Entry 19, which reads, “Admission into, and emigration and expulsion from, India; passports and visas”. However, the parties are discordant to the extent of such power and whether law made by the Parliament can derogate from Article 6 and other provisions of Part II. Finally the Court concluded that the Parliament indeed possesses the legislative power to enact laws concerning citizenship and that this authority is not restricted by the provisions of Part II of the Constitution. Whether Section 6A is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution The petitioners contended that Section 6A is violative of Article 14 on three grounds: (a) Section 6A is under-inclusive because it confers citizenship only to migrants to Assam; (b) there was no justification to single out Assam to the exclusion of other border States that border Bangladesh since they all form a homogenous class; and (c) the provision prescribes a different cut-off date for granting citizenship to migrants who enter Assam as opposed to other States. The Supreme Court observed that for an exclusion of a group to be valid under Article 14, it must rest on reasonable grounds, and the objective of the provision effecting such exclusion must be directly related to its purpose. The Court noted that Section 6A was enacted with the dual objectives of reducing the influx of migrants to India and addressing the situation of those who had already migrated. It highlighted that the Assam Accord served as a political resolution to the issue of increasing migration, while Section 6A represented a legislative measure to address the same. The Court further observed that earlier laws addressing undocumented migration in Assam were not extended to other states because Assam posed a unique challenge to the Union due to the magnitude and impact of migration. Although states like West Bengal, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram share longer borders with Bangladesh, the number of immigrants in these states is significantly lower. The Court pointed out that Assam had 40 lakh immigrants within its relatively smaller population and limited land area, and held that Assam’s immigration problems are unique compared to other states. The objective of the law to reduce migration in the state has a clear nexus. The cut-off dates are rational, as individuals who entered Assam after 25 March 1971 were refugees fleeing Operation Searchlight. making the decision to focus specifically on Assam a rational and justified consideration. The petitioners argued that Section 6A violates Article 14 by not applying the same laws to neighbouring border states. In response, the union stated that the Constitution does not mandate universal application of every law and explained that the Legislature has the authority to enact special laws aimed at achieving specific objectives and, for that purpose, can classify persons, objects, or transactions to which the law applies. He emphasized that differential treatment is only unlawful if it is arbitrary or lacks a rational connection to the statute’s objective. Referring to Ajoy Kumar Banerjee and Others v. Union of India (1984), the counsel for the highlighted the Supreme Court's ruling that Article 14 does not prevent the Legislature from implementing reforms selectively. Counsel for the Union argued that classifications could be justified on historical grounds or administrative necessity, asserting that the Assam Accord represents one such reform based on historical considerations. Additionally, the union cited R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India (1993), where the Court held that territorial classifications do not contravene Article 14. Did the enactment of Section 6A lead to internal disturbances or external aggression, warranting the Union’s protection under Article 355 of the Constitution? The court observed that such an interpretation would lead to disastrous consequences and pointed out that Article 355 is found in Part 18 of the Constitution, which deals with “emergency powers” that can only be invoked by the Union. Reading the duty in Article 355 into a right would effectively place the emergency powers with citizens and courts,” resulting in catastrophic consequences for the federal structure of the Constitution. While analyzing the historical aspects of Art.355, it was not included in the Draft Constitution of 1948. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar later introduced the provision to justify the Union's intervention in the administration of States under the emergency powers conferred by the Constitution. Dr. Ambedkar explained that in a federal setup like the Indian Constitution, where States possess sovereign legislative powers within their domain, the Centre can intervene in State administration only if the Constitution imposes an obligation on the Centre to do so. In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, Justice Sawant, writing for himself and Justice Singh, referred to the Constituent Assembly debates and clarified that Article 355 does not serve as an independent source of power for the Centre to interfere in State governance. Instead, it functions as a justification for actions taken under Articles 356 and 357 Whether section 6A violates cultural rights under Article 29 of the Constitution. The petitioners argued that Assam possesses a unique culture and script, which they have the constitutional right to protect and preserve under Article 29. They contended that Section 6A, by facilitating increased foreign immigration into the state, infringed upon this right, thereby threatening Assam's cultural identity. The Court highlighted the scope of Article 29(1), noting that while its heading refers to the "protection of interests of minorities," the text is not confined to minorities. The provision grants the right to "any section of citizens" with a distinct language, script, or culture. Therefore, Article 29 applies to both minorities and non-minorities, provided two conditions are met: (a) the group constitutes a section of citizens, and (b) the group possesses a distinct language, script, or culture. The Court emphasized that the right under Article 29(1) is the right to "conserve" this distinct identity. It recognized that the people of Assam, or the Assamese, qualify as a section of citizens with a unique language, script, and culture, which they are entitled to protect and conserve under Article 29(1). CONCLUSION In its judgment, the Supreme Court provided a comprehensive analysis of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, and its constitutional validity. The Court underscored that Section 6A was enacted to address the unique and pressing issues arising from the influx of migrants into Assam, which posed significant challenges to the state’s demographic and cultural fabric. The provision was framed as part of the Assam Accord, a political and legislative solution aimed at maintaining peace while managing migration and its implications. The Court examined the petitioners' claims that Section 6A not violated various constitutional provisions, including Articles 6, 7, 10, 11, and 14. It clarified that: Articles 6 and 7: These Articles define the rights of migrants to Indian citizenship based on specific cut-off dates post-Partition. The Court held that Section 6A does not alter these provisions in a manner that contravenes the Constitution, as its intent and framework align with the constitutional scheme. Articles 10 and 11: Article 10 ensures continuity of citizenship rights, and Article 11 empowers Parliament to regulate citizenship through legislation. The Court emphasized that Section 6A was enacted under the authority granted by Article 11, and also entry 17 List 1 and therefore, it does not infringe upon the Constitution. Article 14: The petitioners argued that Section 6A violated the right to equality by applying different rules to Assam compared to other border states. The Court rejected this claim, noting that the classification of Assam was based on rational considerations. Assam faced a unique magnitude and impact of migration, justifying special legislative treatment. The Court reaffirmed that differential treatment is permissible under Article 14 as long as it is based on intelligible criteria and has a rational nexus to the legislative objective. Additionally, the Court addressed the cultural concerns raised under Article 29, recognizing that the Assamese people, with their distinct language, script, and culture, have a constitutional right to conserve their identity. It held that Section 6A does not undermine this right but rather seeks to balance the protection of Assam’s demographic and cultural integrity with the humanitarian considerations for migrants. In conclusion, the Supreme Court articulated that Section 6A is a constitutionally valid provision aimed at addressing Assam’s unique challenges. It does not violate Articles 6, 7, 10, or 11, nor does it infringe upon Article 14, as the legislation is neither arbitrary nor devoid of a rational basis. The judgment reinforced the principle that special laws tailored to address distinct regional issues are consistent with constitutional values.

CONTEMPT, CONTEMPTUOUS & THE CONDEMNED

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Dr.K.P.Kylasanatha Pillay

Contempt is a despicable thing. Causing contempt of the court is reprehensible. Causing contempt of the Supreme Court is horrendous. Courts are institutions of sanctified ambience. Polluting the ecosystem of the court is an offence against the court, constitution and the community. So contempt of court is contemptuous and the contemner is to be condemned for the contumacious behaviour. Here is a saga of the Supreme Court of India smouldering a contemnor who came like a mountain and chased out like a rat.

 

DATA PROTECTION – Emerging trends and its Human rights Perspectives

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Prof. ( Dr) V.L.Mony, Dean, Hindusthan School of Law, Chennai.

Data protection is a significant area, which is focussed in modern times. The significance of the data largely increased largely due to its use and advancement of technology and the purposes for which it can be put. The regulations and protection of the data is largely a matter of human right and liberty. The protection is envisaged in various nations based on their respective rules and regulations. This article analyses the various aspects of data protection and its impact in the society.

The Sorry Status of Criminal Law and its impact on Prison Reforms

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~Prof. Jose Verghese

RARE and exceptional insight into criminal justice system by a doyen of legal education in India, Dr.Jose Verghese. A former vice chancellor, vice chairman of the Central Admintrartive Tribunal and a leading lawyer of Supreme court of India. He has made his impact on the Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) regime especially in Arbitration. An eductionist and researcher par excellence Dr.Jose Verghese is an author of good repute.

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